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I. INTRODUCTION
Although federal law, particularly federal securities law, regu-
lates aspects of many corporations, it is state law that traditionally
governs the formation, structure, and internal relationships of corpo-
rations. Congress could federalize most corporate law, but has delib-
erately chosen not to do so.' Moreover, the Supreme Court of the
United States has repeatedly recognized the importance of state cor-
porate law in our federal system.2 Yet recent federal court decisions
have found state corporate statutes that have an impact on tender
offers unconstitutional as an impermissible burden on interstate com-
merce. These decisions are both undercutting the development of
state law and calling into question existing provisions of state corpo-
rate law.
The Supreme Court has noted probable jurisdiction in CTS Corp.
v. Dynamics Corp. of America 3 and should decide the case this year.
The case raises significant questions about the interplay between the
* © 1987 Arthur R. Pinto.
** Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School. I thank my colleagues Norman Poser and
Roberta Karmel for their review of the article. My debt to my colleague Neil Cohen for his
support and insight is immeasurable. Timothy B. Parlin aided me as my research assistant.
Finally, I thank Brooklyn Law School for its assistance with a summer research stipend.
1. See generally Boyer, Federalism and Corporation Law. Drawing the Line in State
Takeover Regulation, 47 OHIO ST. L.J. - (1987); Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law:
Reflections upon Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 663 (1974).
2. See infra text accompanying notes 102-05.
3. 794 F.2d 250 (7th Cir.), prob. juris noted, 107 S. Ct. 258 (1986).
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interstate commerce clause of the Constitution 4 and state corporate
law.
The increase in the number of hostile takeovers, where an outside
group wants to take over another corporation without the approval of
its management, as a phenomenon of corporate life, has led to
responses by Congress and many state legislatures.' In 1968, Con-
gress passed the Williams Act, 6 which was designed to regulate corpo-
rate takeovers. The first generation of state takeover statutes, enacted
for the most part after the Williams Act, generally gave state officials
broad powers to require additional disclosure beyond that required in
the Williams Act and to determine the fairness of a tender offer and
often extended the time periods provided by the Williams Act. In
Edgar v. Mite Corp. ,' the Supreme Court of the United States found
most of these statutes unconstitutional as an unreasonable burden on
interstate commerce.
Subsequently, state legislatures began to enact statutes applicable
only to corporations that were incorporated in that state. These stat-
utes usually attempt to insure that all shareholders receive equivalent
payments, or require a shareholder vote upon acquisition of a certain
percentage of shares to authorize either the purchase of their shares or
other acquisitions.8 This second generation of statutes often has a
direct impact on the acquisition of shares in a corporation through a
tender offer.
Now, state legislatures have enacted a new third generation of
takeover statutes. These statutes also apply to corporations incorpo-
rated in the state, but do not directly affect the acquisition of shares.
Rather, they affect the ability of the acquiror to vote or use those
shares. Thus, these statutes are more like the traditional corporate
statutes that regulate the internal affairs of corporations.
These statutes have been the target of constitutional attacks
under the commerce clause. I believe that the use of the interstate
commerce clause to invalidate some of these statutes is improper and
unwise. Although one may disagree with these statutes for policy rea-
sons, the use of the commerce clause to strike them down has negative
4. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
5. See generally Aranow & Einhorn, State Securities Regulation of Tender Offers, 46
N.Y.U. L. REV. 767 (1971); Pinto, Takeovers of Public Corporations in the United States, 34
AM. J. COMP. LAW 271 (Supp. 1986).
6. Williams Act, Pub. L. No. 90-439, 82 Stat. 454 (1968) (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. §§ 78m(d)-(e), 78n(d)-(f) (1982)).
7. 457 U.S. 624 (1982).
8. See Warren, Developments in State Takeover Regulations.- Mite and Its Aftermath, 40
Bus. LAW. 671 (1985); see also Sargent, Do the Second Generation State Takeover Statutes
Violate the Commerce Clause?, 8 CORP. L. REV. 3 (1985).
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implications for other state corporate laws and for the internal affairs
doctrine. The result, in effect, may be to federalize some state laws by
allowing federal courts to eliminate significant state corporate law
provisions. If the Supreme Court were to use a preemption analysis9
to avoid the impact of the statutes, the results will be less problematic
for state corporate law development. I believe, however, that the Wil-
liams Act does not preempt many of these statutes. 10
This article will focus on the implications of using the commerce
clause to attack state anti-takeover statutes. I will first discuss the
Supreme Court's response in Edgar to the first generation of state
statutes. The next section describes the various state law models that
legislatures have enacted since Edgar and the implications of the
Court's analysis of the commerce clause on these models. I will then
focus on the importance of the internal affairs doctrine of conflict of
laws as a single law in fostering commerce, the state's role in the mar-
ket for corporate charters, and the contractual nature of corporate
law in analyzing the impact of the commerce clause on these models.
I will review the implications of two recent decisions finding several
statutes unconstitutional for my analysis and will suggest, given my
concerns, how the courts should analyze the statutes.
II. Edgar v. Mite
In 1968, Congress responded to the rising number of hostile
tender offers by enacting the Williams Act, which amended sections
13 and 14 of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934."1 Much of the
Williams Act follows the general approach of federal securities law of
enhancing investor protection by requiring sufficient time and disclo-
9. When Congress exercises its power in an area, the issue of preemption of concurrent
state law under the supremacy clause of the Constitution arises. U.S. CoNsT. art. VI, cl. 2.
Federal law will override state law that conflicts with it. State regulation may be preempted
when -[a] conflict will be found 'where compliance with both federal and state regulations is a
physical impossibility ... or' where state 'law stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and
execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.' " Edgar, 457 U.S. at 631 (citations
omitted) (quoting Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151, 158 (1978)).
10. The argument that the Williams Act preempts state statutes focuses on the
congressional concern in enacting the Act with neutrality between incumbent management
and the hostile offeror. State law that favors incumbent management arguably frustrates the
purpose of the Williams Act. I am not convinced that, in 1968 and 1970, Congress adopted
the market for corporate control as its model for both state and federal regulation of tender
offers. The references to neutrality in the legislative history refer to federal legislation not to
state law. Edgar, 457 U.S. at 655 (Stevens, J., concurring). Congress clearly knew how to
affect shareholders' rights and state corporate law by specifically enacting provisions in the
Williams Act for the protection of investors, such as the mandatory equal opportunity rule in
the Act. See infra note 12.
11. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d)-(e), 78n(d)-(f) (1982) (amended 1968).
1987]
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sure of material information so that the shareholder offerees can
determine whether to tender their shares.12
Although Virginia had a statute dealing with tender offers prior
to the Williams Act, there is no evidence that Congress considered the
Virginia statute when passing the Williams Act.' 3 From the 1968
enactment of the Williams Act until the Supreme Court decision in
Edgar in 1982, a total of thirty-seven states enacted statutes that dealt
with tender offers.' 4 These "first generation" statutes generally pro-
vided additional defenses for incumbent management in fighting hos-
tile tender offers, such as mechanisms that could delay or even halt a
tender offer. The legislatures apparently believed that they were pro-
tecting local investors and industry from the potential disruption a
successful hostile tender offer might cause.'5 Critics, on the other
hand, argued that the legislation was an attempt by state legislatures
to protect incumbent management from losing control.' 6
The Illinois statute challenged in Edgar typified many of these
first generation statutes. The statute provided that the Secretary of
State could hold a fairness hearing concerning a tender offer and
determine whether there was "full and fair disclosure to the offer-
ees."'7 The Secretary of State was empowered to enjoin a nationwide
tender offer if the statute's requirements were not met. The statute
was applicable to a target corporation that had ten percent of its
shareholders in Illinois and satisfied two of the three following condi-
tions: 1) its principal executive offices were located in Illinois; 2) it
was organized under Illinois law; or 3) ten percent of its stated capital
or paid in surplus was situated in Illinois.' 8
A tender offeror challenged the statute on the theories that the
Williams Act preempted it and that its provisions unconstitutionally
burdened interstate commerce. While the Supreme Court found that
the statute was unconstitutional as an "indirect burden" on interstate
commerce, a majority of the Court never reached the preemption
12. See generally T. HAZEN, THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION 359 (1985). The
legislation also gives shareholders an important substantive right, an equal opportunity to
share in the premium offered pursuant to the tender. Securities Exchange Act of 1934.
§ 14(d)(6), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(6) (1982).
13. Edgar, 457 U.S. at 631 n.6.
14. Id.; see also Warren, supra note 8, at 671 nn.2-3.
15. Great W. United Corp. v. Kidwell, 577 F.2d 1256, 1282-83 (5th Cir. 1978), rev'd sub
non. Leroy v. Great W. United Corp., 443 U.S. 173 (1979).
16. Dart Indus. v. Conrad, 462 F. Supp. 1, 9-10 (S.D. Ind. 1978).
17. Illinois Business Take-Over Act, Ii.i. RI-v, SrAr. ch. 121 1/2, 1 157 (1982). repealed
by 1983 III. Laws 365; see also Edgar, 457 U.S. at 627.
18. IiI.. Ruv. SrAr., ch. 121 1/2, 11 137.51-.70 (1982).
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issue.' 9 Justice White, joined by two other Justices, found the Illinois
Act preempted because it frustrated the purposes of the Williams
Act.2" He found that a "major aspect of the effort of the Williams Act
to protect the investor was to avoid favoring either management or
the takeover bidder" and that Congress "expressly embraced a policy
of neutrality."'" The Illinois statute, which favored incumbent man-
agement by enabling it to cause delays that could preclude the share-
holders from making their own choice, inhibited investor autonomy
and thus was not neutral.22 Several courts have used this rationale to
preempt both second and third generation statutes.23
Five Justices in Edgar found that the Illinois statute was an
unconstitutional indirect burden on interstate commerce. Although
states may not regulate interstate commerce directly, they may use
their powers in ways that have an indirect burden on interstate com-
merce unless the burden imposed on interstate commerce exceeds the
"putative local benefits" of the regulation.24 The Court held the bur-
dens imposed by the Illinois statute to be excessive in relation to the
local interests served by the statute. 25 The statute burdened interstate
commerce, according to the Court, because it interfered with nation-
wide tender offers and affected shareholders and the economy. 26 The
frustration of tender offers causes shareholders to lose an opportunity
to sell their shares at a premium, lessens the reallocation of economic
resources to a higher valued use, and hinders the incentive manage-
ment has to perform well to avoid a hostile tender offer.27
Illinois claimed that a benefit of the legislation was the protection
of shareholders. The Court found the interest to be insufficient. First,
Illinois had no interest in protecting out-of-state shareholders. Sec-
ond, the exemption in the statute for self-tenders by target corpora-
tions undermined the state's argument that the statute protected
investors. Finally, some of the protection provided by the statute on
19. For a discussion of preemption, see supra note 9.
20. Edgar, 457 U.S. at 630-40.
21. Id. at 633.
22. Id. at 637-38. Delays provided by the timing requirements of some statutes can be
viewed as interfering with the timing requirements of the Williams Act. See Canadian Pac.
Enters. (U.S.) Inc. v. Krouse, 506 F. Supp 1192 (S.D. Ohio 1981).
23. See, e.g., Dynamics Corp. of Am. v. CTS Corp., 794 F.2d 250 (7th Cir. 1986) (finding
that federal law preempts Indiana's voting rights third generation statute); lcahn v. Blunt, 612
F. Supp. 1400 (W.D. Mo. 1985) (finding that federal law preempted Missouri's shareholder
approval second generation takeover statute); see also infra notes 32-54 and accompanying text
(discussing the statutory models).
24. Edgar, 457 U.S. at 646.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 643-44.
27. Id.; see infra notes 76-83 and accompanying text.
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disclosure and timing went beyond that provided in the Williams Act
and did not appear to enhance investor protection. If there were ben-
efits to these requirements, they were speculative and outweighed by
the burden caused by management's enhanced ability to defend
against a tender offer."
Illinois also claimed that its statute merely regulated the internal
affairs of Illinois corporations. The internal affairs doctrine is a con-
flict of laws principle that generally applies the law of the state of
incorporation to matters that involve the relationship among share-
holders, managers, and directors of a corporation.29 The Court did
not discuss the significance of the internal affairs doctrine to the com-
merce clause because it found the doctrine to be inapplicable.
According to the Court, tender offers involve transactions between
shareholders and offerors which do not implicate the internal affairs
doctrine. In addition, the Illinois statute did not require the corpora-
tions to be incorporated in Illinois and the doctrine does not cover
foreign corporations. °
III. LEGISLATIVE RESPONSES
In an attempt to avoid the fate of the Illinois statute, several state
legislatures have enacted or amended their statutes so as to withstand
constitutional attack. If a majority of the Court were to adopt Justice
White's preemption view, however, there would be little room for
state law that impacts on tender offers. Most takeover statutes would
probably be unconstitutional as favoring management, thereby not
maintaining neutrality." The states have primarily sought to avoid
the commerce clause problem. In this endeavor, they have used sev-
eral different statutory models.
One of the first approaches to the Edgar problem was a "share-
holder approval model" that was first enacted in Ohio. 32 The law
28. Edgar, 457 U.S. at 643-44; see infra notes 84-86 and accompanying text.
29. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE CONFLICT OF LAWS § 302 (1971).
30. Edgar, 457 U.S. at 645.
31. In Piper v. Chris-Craft Industries, the Supreme Court stated: "[N]eutrality is, rather,
but one characteristic of legislation directed toward a different purpose-the protection of
investors." 430 U.S. 1, 29 (1977). One could argue that if the state legislation helps investors,
then federal law does not preempt it. For example, the second tier model may protect
investors by assuring equal opportunity. See infra text accompanying notes 35-38. Although
the statute may increase costs that could deter an offer, the primary purpose of the Williams
Act is investor protection.
32. OHIO REV. CoI-t ANN. §§ 1701.01, .831 (Anderson 1985). See generally Kreider,
Fortress Without Foundation? Ohio Takeover Act 1I, 52 U. CIN. L. RF v. 108 (1983). The
Sixth Circuit held the statute unconstitutional on preemption and commerce clause grounds.
Fleet Aerospace Corp. v. Hoderman, 796 F.2d 135 (6th Cir. 1986).
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applied only to corporations incorporated in Ohio.33 Furthermore, its
provisions were applicable only if the Ohio corporation had fifty or
more resident shareholders, and its principal place of business, princi-
pal executive offices, or substantial assets were located in Ohio. The
acquisition of the shares of a corporation subject to the Ohio statute
would require the approval of the disinterested shareholders at spe-
cific ownership thresholds.34 Thus a corporation was to treat the
tender offer similar to other forms of acquisitions, such as mergers, by
requiring a shareholder vote.
A different approach, taken by Maryland,3" was a "second tier"
model which focused on the strategy of some offerors to use the front
loaded two-tier takeover. That strategy involves, as a first step, the
offeror announcing a tender offer for a sufficient number of shares to
gain control of the corporation. The tender offer, usually in cash, is at
a higher price than the price the offeror has announced it will pay to
the remaining shareholders in a second step transaction. In the sec-
ond step, the offeror now in control votes to effectuate what is called a
freezeout transaction, such as a merger, through which the sharehold-
ers lose their equity position.36 When shareholders are faced with an
offer of a higher price in cash in the tender offer and the lower price in
the freezeout, they will generally feel compelled to tender their shares
to try to receive the premium. Commentators and courts have sug-
gested that such tactics are coercive, because they force shareholders
to tender for the higher price, and unfair to unsophisticated share-
holders who fail to tender at that price. 37 The Maryland statute
sought to respond to this concern by assuring the shareholder of a
Maryland corporation either a supermajority vote on the second stage
of the transaction or a fair price to the nontendering shareholders that
would be at least as much as the price offered in the first tier tender
33. OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.01(A) (Anderson 1985).
34. The Ohio Takeover Act established three thresholds for shareholder voting on
acquisitions of: (a) one fifth to one third of the voting stock; (b) one third to less than a
majority; or (c) a majority or more. Id. § 1701.01(Z)(1).
35. MD. CORPS. & ASS'NS CODE ANN. §§ 3-601 to -603, 8-301(14) (1985); Scriggins &
Clarke, Takeovers and the 1983 Maryland Fair Price Legislation, 43 MD. L. REV. 266 (1984).
36. See Comment, Going Private, 84 YA. L.J. 903, 928-29 (1985). The shareholders who
are in a minority position usually must accept the payment offered or seek appraisal.
Appraisal is not often a viable alternative because it is time-consuming and uncertain.
37. Id.; see also Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985)
(permitting Unocal to exclude a hostile offeror from a self tender because, among other things,
the court was concerned with front loaded two-tiered takeovers); Bebchuk. Towards
Undistorted Choice and Equal Treatment in Corporate Takeovers, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1695.
1696 (1985) (arguing that these offers lead to a distorted choice by shareholders because they
fear they will be excluded from the premium price).
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offer. 38
A third approach, the "share redemption model," enacted in
Pennsylvania, requires any shareholder who acquires a certain per-
centage of stock (such as thirty percent) to buy out the remaining
shareholders at "fair value" upon their demand. 39 This model, like
the second tier model, avoids the problems of the two tier front loaded
tender offer and provides shareholders with equal opportunity to be
bought out at a fair price.4°
Another approach, also taken by Pennsylvania,4 t can be
described as the "fiduciary duty model." It authorizes the board of
directors to consider the effects of any of the board's actions on
employees, suppliers, and customers of the corporation and the com-
munities in which the corporation is located. 42 By expanding the fidu-
ciary concept, the statute allows directors to employ legitimately any
defensive strategy to resist hostile tender offers that negatively impact
on corporate constituencies other than shareholders.43
38. See supra note 35. Several corporations have enacted the equivalent of the Maryland
statute by requiring a fair price provision in the certificate of incorporation. See Profusek &
Gompf, State Takeover Legislation After MITE: Standing Pat, Blue Sky, or Corporation Law
Concepts?, 7 CORP. L. REV. 3, 30 n.168 (1984).
39. 15 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 1408B, 1409.1(c)(1)-(3), 1910 (Purdon 1986). The fair
price will be determined in a manner comparable to other appraisal proceedings, but any
premium the offeror paid will also be considered. Id.; Newlin & Gilmer, The Pennsylvania
Shareholder Protection Act: A New State Approach to Deflecting Corporate Takeover Bids, 40
Bus. LAW. 111, 115 (1984). It is possible that fair value could be determined by appraisal in
the "share redemption model" to be greater than the amount offered in the first tier.
40. In Great Britain, the City Code on Takeovers and Mergers requires an offeror, upon
acquiring 30% of the securities, to purchase the remaining shares. DeMott, Current Issues in
Tender Offer Regulation: Lessons from the British, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 945, 960 (1983).
41. 15 PA. STAT. ANN. § 1408 (Purdon Supp. 1984-1985).
42. Id. § 1408B. Corporations have enacted social responsibility charter amendments
which are similar to the model. See, e.g., Profusek & Gompf, supra note 38, at 30 n.168. Ohio
recently enacted several changes to its corporate law in response to Sir Goldsmith's attempt to
takeover Goodyear Tire and Rubber. Greenhouse, Ohio's Tough Takeover Curb, N.Y. Times,
Dec. 16, 1986, at D2. The amendments extend the protection of the business judgment rule to
changes in control and termination of the director's services and place the burden on a plaintiff
to establish a violation using a clear and convincing evidence standard. OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 1701.59(c) (Anderson 1986). In addition, the directors can consider the long-term
interests of the corporation and the possibility that the independence of the corporation may
serve those interests. Id. § 1701.59(E)(4).
43. In Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., the Supreme Court of Delaware, in
upholding a self tender which excluded a hostile offeror, stated that "the board's power to act
derives from its fundamental duty and obligation to protect the corporate enterprise, which
includes stockholders." 493 A.2d 946, 954 (Del. 1985). But cf. Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews
& Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986) (indicating that a lock up option could
violate a director's fiduciary duty). The Revlon court indicated that Unocal permits
consideration of other constituencies provided there are "rationally related benefits accruing to
the stockholders." Id. at 182.
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Many states, including Minnesota," have enacted the "full dis-
closure model." This statutory model requires an offeror to give a
variety of information to the shareholders.4  The increased disclosure
can include more information about the offeror and the impact of the
tender offer on all of the corporate constituencies and the commu-
nity.46 The state legislatures have limited the application of these stat-
utes to shareholders residing in the state of incorporation. 7 Failure
to comply with the statutes precludes the tender offer only in that
state because an offeror may choose to make its offer in other states.48
A "voting rights model" has recently been adopted in a number
of states, including the Indiana statute which the Supreme Court will
review in CTS. 49 Under this model, shareholders who acquire a cer-
tain percentage of shares may be denied their voting rights unless they
comply with the statute. The statutes usually require the vote of the
disinterested shareholders in order for the offeror to have voting
rights in the additional shares acquired.50 The statute may also
restrict the transferability of the shares and provide for redemption by
44. 1984 MINN. SESS. LAW SERv. 488 (West). In Cardiff Acquisitions, Inc. v. Hatch, the
court found the Minnesota full disclosure statute to be constitutional on both commerce clause
and preemption grounds. 751 F.2d 906 (8th Cir. 1984).
45. Some of the information required by the statutes is often similar to that required under
the Williams Act. In Cardiff, the court emphasized that repetition may be beneficial given the
limited resources of the SEC in enforcing its rules. 751 F.2d at 912. But cf. National City
Lines v. LLC Corp., 687 F.2d 1122, 1131-32 (1985) (additional disclosure " 'may accomplish
more harm than good' by confusing shareholders").
46. E.g., N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 1603(a) (McKinney 1986). See generally Pinto &
McGrath, Problems and Issues Raised in State's New Takeover Law, N.Y.L.J., Mar. 17, 1986,
at 21 (discussing New York statute).
47. E.g., N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW §§ 1601(c)-(d), 1602 (McKinney 1986).
48. An offeror seeking to continue its tender offer in another state may invoke the SEC's
recent all holders rule, which allows an offeror to avoid making an offer in a given state if the
offeror has made a good faith attempt to comply with the statute of that state, but has been
barred from making an offer due to administrative or judicial action, so long as the statute is
held to be constitutional. Amendments to Tender Offer Rules-All-Holders and Best Price,
[Current] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 84,016 (July 11, 1986).
49. Dynamics Corp. of Am. v. CTS Corp., 794 F.2d 250 (7th Cir.), prob. juris noted, 107
S. Ct. 258 (1986).
50. IND. CODE §§ 23-1-42-1 to -11 (1986). The statute does not define a disinterested
shareholder, but "interested shares" means
the shares of an issuing public corporation in respect of which any of the
following persons may exercise or direct the exercise of the voting power of the
corporation in the election of directors:
(I) An acquiring person or member of a group with respect to a control
share acquisition.
(2) Any officer of the issuing public corporation.
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the target corporation."'
The "business combination model," which originated in New
York, 2 differs significantly from the other models because it does not
directly affect an offeror's ability to acquire or vote its shares. In fact,
there are no restrictions on an offeror's ability to acquire or use the
shares. This model focuses on the ability to use the target's assets
after control has been acquired. Once a shareholder acquires a cer-
tain percentage of stock in a corporation, that "interested share-
holder" must receive director approval before it acquires more shares
or before it seeks a business combination with the corporation. 3 Fail-
ure either to seek or to receive the requisite approval precludes future
business combinations between the interested shareholder and the
corporation for a specified period or a shorter period if the disinter-
ested shareholders approve of opting out of the statute. Because busi-
ness combinations are broadly defined in the statute, 4 the model
effectively limits an acquiror's ability to effectuate transactions that
freezeout the minority shareholders to take complete control of the
corporation or to use the corporate assets to finance the acquisition
through leveraging. A business combination is required for those
transactions.
The voting rights and business combination models represent
what I describe as the third generation of state statutes. They allow
the tender offer to occur, but severely limit the offeror's rights in the
corporation.
All of the models are found in various states, sometimes in
combination with each other 5 and often with differing require-
51. Id. § 23-1-42-10. Wisconsin has a variation of this model which provides that anyone
who acquires in excess of 20% of the voting power shall be limited to 10% of the voting power
of those shares. WIs. STAr. § 180.25(9)(a) (1986).
52. N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 912 (McKinney 1986). See generally Pinto & McGrath,
supra note 46; Pinto, N. Y Law, Nat'l L. J., Feb. 24, 1986, at 17.
53. N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 912(b). In New York, an interested shareholder is one who
owns 20% of the voting stock. Id. § 912(a)(10).
54. Under New York law, the definition of a business combination includes mergers and
consolidations; sales or dispositions of assets having a value equal to 10% or more of the
aggregate market value of all assets; liquidations and recapitalizations; issuance or transfer to
an interested shareholder by the resident domestic corporation of any stock having a market
value of 5% or more of the aggregate market value of all the outstanding stock of the
corporation; a reclassification of the securities or any other transaction that results in an
increase in the interested shareholders' proportionate share of the outstanding shares, and any
receipt by the interested shareholders of loans, tax credits or other financial assistance from the
resident domestic corporation. Id. § 912(a)(5).
55. E.g., IND. Comir § 23-1-42-1 to -11 (1986). Indiana's statute includes both the voting
rights and business combination models. Only the voting rights model was found
unconstitutional in Dynamics Corp. of America v. CTS Corp., 794 F.2d 250 (7th Cir.), prob.
juris noted, 107 S. Ct. 250 (1986).
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ments 6 What is common to most of the state statutes is that they
apply only to corporations that are incorporated in that state. In
addition, the statutes often require that there be some shareholders
residing in the state and that the principal executive offices or signifi-
cant assets are located in the state. Unlike the first generation statute
invalidated in Edgar, none of the models, except the full disclosure
model, involves any state administrative mechanism with the tender
offer. Many of the statutes have either an opting out or opting in
provision, which allows a corporation to elect whether it should be
covered by aspects of the model.
IV. THE COMMERCE CLAUSE
It is important to determine whether any of these models is per-
missible under the commerce clause to evaluate the extent to which
states can regulate tender offers. If the commerce clause severely lim-
its or precludes this type of state activity, then other state corporate
law that affects tender offers may also be impermissible.
The commerce clause of the Constitution provides, "Congress
shall have the Power ... to regulate Commerce ... among the several
States .... -"5 Although the clause clearly gives Congress authority
to regulate commerce, it does not explicitly restrict the states when
Congress has not regulated. It is the "great silences" of the Constitu-
tion which have given the Supreme Court the power to determine the
role of the states in regulating interstate commerce. 8 If Congress has
taken no action in an area, then the extent to which a state can regu-
late interstate activities rests on the "dormant" or unexercised com-
merce clause.59 In Cooley v. Board of Wardens,6" the Court
56. Both Indiana and New York have business combination model statutes, yet Indiana
has a 10% interested shareholder requirement, while New York requires 20%. Compare IND.
CODE § 23-1-43-10(a)(1)-(2) with N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 912(a)(10).
57. U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
58. H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. DuMond, 336 U.S. 525, 535 (1949).
59. See G. GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 230 (llth ed. 1985); see also Tushnet,
Rethinking the Dormant Commerce Clause, 1979 Wis. L. REV. 125. According to Professor
Tushnet, courts should use the dormant commerce clause sparingly, especially given
Congress's ability to preempt state law. He would use an enhanced due process analysis of
state regulation. Id. at 125; see also Eule, Laying the Dormant Commerce Clause to Rest, 91
YALE L.J. 425 (1982). Professor Eule argues that state parochialism today is more likely to
eviscerate the democratic process than free trade and argues for a process-oriented protection
of representational government. Id. at 428-29. He also emphasizes the ability of Congress to
preempt state law as a reason to limit the use of the dormant commerce clause especially given
the role of regulatory agencies. Id. at 435. Congress plays an active role in securities law
issues and the SEC has shown a willingness to use its power to preempt state law. For
example, the all holders rule, see supra note 48, preempted the Delaware Supreme Court
decision in Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985); see supra note 43
(discussing Unocal).
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established the principle that state activity that affects interstate com-
merce will "be judged in light of the desirability of permitting diverse
responses to local needs and the undesirability of permitting local
interference with such uniformity as the unimpeded flow of interstate
commerce may require.
61
When analyzing state economic regulation, the courts will
attempt to distinguish between "direct" and "indirect" state activ-
ity.62 The courts will generally strike down a statute that regulates
interstate commerce directly, discriminates against interstate com-
merce, or favors state economic interests over out-of-state interests.63
When a nondiscriminatory statute has an indirect effect on interstate
commerce, courts will uphold the statute if it "regulates even-
handedly to effectuate a legitimate local public interest, and its effects
on interstate commerce are only incidental . . . unless the burden
imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the puta-
tive local benefits."
64
A plurality of four Justices in Edgar found the Illinois statute to
be a direct burden on interstate commerce and therefore invalid.65
The plurality found the statute to be a direct burden because it could
preclude shareholders who were residents of another state from trans-
acting in interstate commerce with the offeror. 66 The plurality was
concerned that other states would impose similar regulations that
could stifle interstate tender offers. The Court also indicated that a
statute whose application takes place wholly outside of a state, even if
it has effects within the state, is not permissible.6"
If the post-Edgar statutes directly burden interstate commerce,
60. 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299 (1851).
61. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 325 (1978). According to Professor
Tribe, the issue of whether to classify the regulation as "national" or "local" has become less
important and the focus is now on how the state proposes to regulate interstate commerce. Id.
62. Professor Tribe indicated that the labels of direct and indirect burden are only
conclusory and misleading and, in their place, the Court has substituted a more indeterminate
principle. State regulation will be upheld if (1) it is rationally related to a legitimate state end,
and (2) the burden imposed on interstate commerce and any resulting discrimination are
outweighed by the state's interest in enforcing the regulation. Id. at 326. The Court appears
to recognize the difficulty in distinguishing between direct and indirect burdens, but still uses
the distinction. See Edgar v. Mite, 457 U.S. 624, 640-41 (1982).
63. Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. New York State Liquor Auth., 106 S. Ct. 2080,
2084 (1986).
64. Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970).
65. Edgar, 457 U.S. at 643. In Brown-Forman, the Court cited the plurality in Edgar,
which could indicate that a majority of the Court now views the Illinois statute as a direct
regulation. Brown-Forman, 106 S. Ct. at 2084, 2086.
66. Edgar, 457 U.S. at 642.
67. Id. at 642-43. The Court indicated that it will look to whether the practical effect of
regulation is beyond the state. Id. at 643.
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then a court should find them invalid without weighing their benefits.
For example, the plurality's reasoning indicates that the shareholder
approval model affects nationwide tender offers more directly than
other models because it includes a mechanism that can preclude the
acquisition of shares in a nationwide tender offer. The other models
may in fact defeat or deter a tender offer but do not directly prohibit
it.6" Under the shareholder approval model, an offeror is unable to
acquire shares unless it receives approval by a vote of disinterested
shareholders.69 This provision in effect replaces the tender offer mar-
ket with a market for votes through a proxy fight.
Although the shareholder approval model may have more of a
direct impact on interstate commerce than do the other models, it
does not follow that such regulation is per se invalid and not subject
to the balancing tests used when there is indirect impact. In Edgar,
the Illinois statute gave a governmental agency the power to stop a
tender offer, while the determination of whether a tender offer is
accepted under the shareholder approval model depends on the non-
governmental action of the shareholders. In Brown-Forman Distillers
Corp. v. New York State Liquor Authority,7 0 the Supreme Court
referred to Edgar when it indicated that seeking "regulatory approval
in one state before undertaking a transaction in another directly regu-
lates interstate commerce. '"' Thus, the shareholder approval model
is not an example of direct state regulation of interstate commerce;
rather it regulates corporations and allows shareholder voting, which
may have an effect on interstate commerce, and therefore should be
considered at most an indirect regulation.
The second tier, fiduciary duty, redemption, full disclosure, vot-
ing rights, and business combination models have, if anything, an
indirect impact on tender offers because they do not prohibit the offer.
68. If a substantial number of shareholders is present in the state of incorporation, a state
agency, under the full disclosure model, may effectively preclude a tender offer by prohibiting
the offer in that state. See infra note 72.
69. Recent post-Edgar decisions have found state shareholder approval statutes to be
direct restraints on interstate commerce. Fleet Aerospace Corp. v. Holderman, 637 F. Supp.
742, 760-61 (S.D. Ohio), aff'd, 796 F.2d 135 (6th Cir. 1986) (Ohio Control Share Acquisition
Act); Terry v. Yamashita, 643 F. Supp. 161 (D. Haw. 1986) (Hawaii Control Share
Acquisition Act). Both courts followed the reasoning of the plurality opinion in Edgar. The
court in Terry suggested that the Supreme Court's reliance on Edgar in Brown-Forman
indicated that a majority of the Court "now squarely disapproved of such a direct regulation
on interstate commerce." Terry, 643 F. Supp. at 165 (discussing Brown-Forman Distillers
Corp. v. New York State Auth., 106 S. Ct. 2080 (1986)). Yet the Ohio and Hawaii statutes
differed from the statute in Brown-Forman because they required shareholder approval of the
tender offer as opposed to government approval.
70. 106 S. Ct. 2080 (1986).
71. Id. at 2086.
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These models regulate corporate actions that either make the tender
offer more costly or frustrate the plans of the offeror. Similar to other
blue sky regulation, the full disclosure model restricts its application
to shareholders within the state and can only limit the tender offer in
that state.72 The redemption model allows tender offers so long as all
the shareholders are treated equally. The fiduciary model allows
tender offers, but gives directors more discretion to adopt defensive
tactics that can thwart the offer. The second tier, voting rights, and
business combination models allow the offeror to acquire shares on
any terms it chooses, but affect its ability to use those acquired shares.
The second tier model restricts voting by the offeror only on transac-
tions that would freezeout shareholders. The voting rights model has
a greater negative impact on the offeror because it restricts all voting
rights, which is the fundamental reason to buy shares. If the model
also restricts transferability or requires redemption of shares, then it
leaves the offeror with little reason to buy the shares. The business
combination model has a lesser impact than the other two models
because it prevents the offeror from using its shares to effectuate
transactions for its benefit, but allows the offeror to vote its shares to
gain control of the corporation.
A majority of five Justices in Edgar used the balancing test to
hold that the Illinois statute was an impermissible indirect burden on
interstate commerce. 7  The Court found that the burdens the statute
imposed were excessive in relation to the benefits. The Court indi-
cated that the burden of the Illinois statute was its negative impact on
nationwide tender offers and shareholders because it interfered with
the market for corporate control. The theory of the market for corpo-
rate control is based upon the assumption that the trading markets
are efficient and the price of a corporation's stock reflects all available
information about the corporation. 74  Because management runs a
corporation without a substantial equity interest in the corporation, a
72. In Edgar, the Court appeared to view the blue sky regulation favorably as being
explicitly allowed by Congress in section 28 of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, and as
applying to transactions within the state. Edgar, 457 U.S. at 641 (discussing 15 U.S.C.
§ 78bb(a) (1982)). Yet the Court's broad language, which supports the market for corporate
control, could undercut such regulation if for example there is a significant number of
shareholders in a state, which would in effect stop the offer. In Martin-Marietta Corp. v.
Bendix Corp., the court suggested that a statute that prevents local shareholders from
participating in a nationwide tender offer might have the effect of defeating tender offers where
the tender offer can succeed only with the participation of the local residents. 690 F.2d 558,
567 (6th Cir. 1982).
73. Edgar, 457 U.S. at 643-44.
74. See J. LORIE & M. HAMILTON, THE STOCK MARKET: THEORIES AND EVIDENCE 70-
97 (1973); see also Note, The Efficient Capital Market Hypothesis, Economic Theory and the
Regulation of the Securities Industry, 29 STAN. L. REV. 1031 (1977). But see Lowenstein,
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possibility exists that it may manage the corporation inefficiently or
for its own interests. Assuming the efficiency of the market, the price
of the corporation's stock will reflect the fact that management is not
maximizing value and will attract an offeror willing to pay a premium
over the market price to run the corporation more efficiently. 5
The Court gave three reasons why interference with the market
for corporate control burdened interstate commerce. First, if tender
offers are prevented, shareholders are deprived of an opportunity to
sell their shares at a premium.76 While it is generally true that share-
holders receive more than the current market price, it is not so clear
that all shareholders do in fact benefit by the premium compared to
the value of the shares after a thwarted tender offer.7 7 Second,
according to the Court, tender offers reallocate economic resources to
their higher valued use, which should in theory improve efficiency and
competition. 78  Again, it is not clear that the shareholders of the
offeror benefit by an acquisition. Recent studies have indicated that
acquiring companies are not benefiting their own shareholders with
tender offers. 79 The fact that someone is willing to pay more for a
corporation does not mean that efficiency will follow. In both micro
and macro economic terms, the verdict is still out on the benefits of
hostile takeovers."0 Third, the tender offer provides a mechanism
motivating incumbent management to perform well in order to keep
prices high.8 ' While the trading markets are generally efficient, it
does not follow that the price of a corporation's stock on a given day
reflects the intrinsic value of the corporation or its value in the acqui-
Pruning Deadwood in Hostile Takeovers. A Proposal for Legislation, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 249,
274-76 (1983); infra note 82.
75. Easterbrook & Fischel, The Proper Role of a Target's Management in Responding to a
Tender Offer, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1161, 1173-74 (1981); see also COUNCIL OF ECONOMIC
ADVISORS, 1985 ECONOMIC REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT 187-88 (1985).
76. Edgar, 457 U.S. at 643-44.
77. Lipton, Takeover Bids in the Targets Boardroom, 35 Bus. LAW. 101, 109-10 (1979).
But see F. Easterbrook & G. Jarrell, SEC Advisory Committee on Tender Offers 48-49 (July 8,
1983) (dissenting statements in an unpublished report based on efficient capital market
hypothesis).
78. Edgar, 457 U.S. at 643-44.
79. See, e.g., Scherer, Takeovers: Present and Future Dangers, 4 BROOKINGS REV. 15
(Winter/Spring 1986). Contra Ginsburg & Robinson, The Case Against Federal Intervention
in the Market Jbr Corporate Control, 4 BROOKINUS REV. 9 (Winter/Spring 1986).
80. See. e.g.. Coffee, Regulating the Market for Corporate Control. A Critical Assessment of
the Tender Offer's Role in Corporate Governance, 84 COIUM. L. REV. 1145 (1984).
81. Edgar, 457 U.S. at 643-44. Many commentators have argued that offerors seek out
well-managed corporations. Eg., Lipton, Takeover Bids in the Target's Boardroom, 35 Bus.
LAW. 101 (1979). It is argued that the shares of those corporations that take the long-term
view trade at prices below their intrinsic value, subjecting the corporations to hostile takeover
threats. See E. HERMAN, CORPORATEI CONTROL., CORPORATI: POWIR 98-103 (1981);
Lowenstein, supra note 74, at 268-76.
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sitions market.8 2 The Court's wholesale adoption of the market for
corporate control thesis without noting its deficiencies or its impact
on other concerns in corporate law seems unwarranted. 3
The two benefits that Illinois cited to defend its statute were that
the statute protected resident shareholders and merely regulated the
internal affairs of Illinois corporations. The Edgar Court had little
difficulty in dismissing these concerns because the scope of the legisla-
tion went well beyond the protection of resident shareholders and
there were insufficient benefits to justify this impact.8 4 In addition,
the statute exempted the target corporation's acquisition of its own
shares undercutting the Illinois argument of investor protection. The
Court dismissed the internal affairs issue because, in the tender offer
context, the issues involve the transfers of shares between sharehold-
ers, which does not implicate the internal affairs of the target corpora-
tion. 5 In addition, the statute did not require that the corporation be
incorporated in Illinois and Illinois had no interest in regulating the
internal affairs of foreign corporations.86
The articulated reasons for state takeover legislation other than
investor protection and the internal affairs doctrine include the pro-
tection of local industry, employment, and the long-term growth of
local companies. 87  These arguments have not fared well with the
courts. Courts faced with this rationale are skeptical about whether
the legislation in fact produces the benefits ascribed to it. One court
indicated that it will not assume that a state's interest is furthered by a
statute; the court stated that it "has the constitutional duty to deter-
mine whether state-desired benefits can, in fact, result from the statute
and only those which are not speculative may be placed in the scale to
be balanced against the burden on interstate commerce. '8  The legis-
82. Lowenstein, supra note 74. Recent articles have questioned the use of the efficient
market theory in developing corporate law. See Kornhauser, Gordon & Kornhauser, Efficient
Markets, Costly Information, and Securities Research, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 761 (1985); Wang,
Some Arguments that the Stock Market is Not Efficient, 19 CALIF. L. REV. 341 (1986).
83. Cf. Buxbaum, Federalism and Company Law, 82 MICH. L. REV. 1163, 1165-66 (1984).
84. Edgar, 457 U.S at 644.
85. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 302 comment e (1971).
86. Edgar, 457 U.S. at 644.
87. Icahn v. Blunt, 612 F. Supp. 1400, 1417 (W.D. Mo. 1985); see also Edgar, 457 U.S. at
648 (Powell, J., concurring). One commentator has suggested that takeover regulation may be
prompted by four concerns: I) states want to assure resident shareholders enough time and
information; 2) states are exercising their rights to prescribe share attributes in corporations
organized in that state; 3) states are concerned with maintaining local plants and facilities; and
4) states are interested in the quality of life in the areas where the corporations are
headquartered. Boehm, State Interests and Interstate Commerce: A Look at the Theoretical
Underpinnings of Takeover Legislation, 36 WASH. & LEE L. Ri:\'. 733, 746 (1979).




lation that generally favors incumbent management in its ability to
thwart a tender offer does not appear to protect a state's business cli-
mate because it is not clear that either a hostile offer will negatively
affect the local economy or that the incumbent management has any
great concern for a particular state.89 The fact that legislation has a
potentially economic parochial basis may make it easier to attack on
economic protectionist grounds. There also may be more direct ways
to accomplish the desired results than to expect that management will
look out for the economic interests of the state.
Assuming the Court will continue to use the balancing test in
cases involving those statutory models that have an indirect impact on
tender offers and will continue to adopt the market for corporate con-
trol thesis that tender offers benefit shareholders and society, then to
what extent should the commerce clause invalidate the various mod-
els previously described? What benefits and burdens should the Court
consider when looking at these various models?
The Court in balancing the burdens and benefits should weigh
heavily the importance of the internal affairs doctrine which comes
into play particularly with the third generation statutes. The doctrine
provides advantages as the source of a single law and as a necessary
component of the market for corporate charters. Indeed, because the
Edgar Court recognized the importance of the market for corporate
control thesis espoused by the law and economics movement, 90 the
Court should also recognize the significant advantages to shareholders
that flow from a competitive market for corporate charters and the
contractual nature of corporate law. These features of state takeover
statutes indicate that the burdens placed on commerce, if any, are
likely to be small.
V. INTERNAL AFFAIRS
The internal affairs doctrine is a conflict of laws principle that
suggests that the law of the state of incorporation shall govern intra-
corporate relationships such as matters concerning the relationship
among or between the corporation and its officers, directors, and
shareholders.91 In some cases where a state other than the state of
89. Icahn, 612 F. Supp. at 1417.
90. The Court in Edgar cited Professors Easterbrook and Fischel to support its view that
interference with hostile takeovers burdens interstate commerce. Edgar, 457 U.S. at 643-44
(citing Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 75; Fischel, Efficient Capital Market Theory. the
Market for Corporate Control, and the Regulation of Cash Tender Offers, 57 TEX. L. REV. 1, 5,
27-28, 45 (1978)). See supra text accompanying notes 76-81.
91. See RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF CONFLICT OiF LAWS § 302 comment e (1971). See
generally DeMott, Perspectives on Choice of Law Jbr Corporate Internal Affairs, 48 LAW &
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incorporation has a more significant relationship to a particular issue
and the parties, its law will apply.9 2 Thus, many of the statutory
models require a significant relationship, such as significant corporate
assets, principal place of business, or significant number of resident
shareholders in a state, in addition to the requirement of incorpora-
tion in a state.93 The internal affairs doctrine, which requires the use
of one state's law, encourages convenience and predictability of legal
application.94
A. Single Law Principle
In considering the constitutional implications of the internal
affairs doctrine, most commentators and courts have focused on the
full faith and credit clause95 or the due process clause of the four-
teenth amendment,96 although some commentators have recognized
that the interstate commerce clause might serve as a basis for estab-
lishing constitutional choice of law rules.97 As Professor Horowitz
has suggested, courts should use the commerce clause in choice of law
analysis when more than one state has an interest in having its law
prevail and should choose the law that facilitates multistate commer-
cial transactions, i.e., keeps interstate commerce free of unreasonable
burdens. In the case of the legal relationships among shareholders,
creditors, and others who are widely dispersed, the use of a single rule
of law benefits interstate commerce. The use of the internal affairs
CONTEMP. PROBS. 161 (1985). The Maryland Supreme Court has provided a widely accepted
definition: "[W]here the act complained of affects the complainant solely in his capacity as a
member of the corporation, whether it be as stockholder, director, president, or other officer,
and is the act of the corporation, whether acting in stockholders' meeting, or through its
agents, the board of directors, then such action is the management of the internal affairs of the
corporation ...." North State Copper & Gold Mining Co. v. Field, 64 Md. 151, 154, 20 A.
1039, 1040 (1885).
92. Section 302(2) of the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws indicates that:
The local law of the state of incorporation will be applied to determine such
issues, except in the usual case where, with respect to the particular issue, some
other state has a more significant relationship to the occurrence and the parties,
in which event the local law of the other state will be applied.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 302(2) (1971).
93. For example, New York's business combination model applies to "resident domestic
corporations" which are corporations incorporated in New York with their principal executive
offices and significant business operations located in New York and at least 10% of their voting
stock owned by New York residents. N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 912(a)(13) (McKinney 1986).
94. RESTATEiMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 302 comment b (1971).
95. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
96. U.S. CONsTr. amend. XIV, § 1. See generally Kozyris, Corporate Wars and Choice of
Law, 1985 DUKI. L.J. 1; Reese & Kaufman, The Law Governing Corporate Affairs: Choice of
Law and the Impact of Full Faith and Credit, 58 Coi.UM. L. Rrv. 1118 (1958).
97. Horowitz, The Commerce Clause as a Limitation oil State Choice-o/ Law Doctrine, 84
HARv. L. Rrv. 806 (1971); Reese & Kaufman, supra note 96, at 1129 n.42.
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doctrine in corporate law, under which a single rule of law is selected,
minimizes the problems of multiple state regulation.98
Edgar has been viewed as potentially giving support to the view
that a single rule of law should apply.99 If the internal affairs doctrine
dictates the use of the law of incorporation as the single law, it would
obviate the plurality's concern in Edgar of the problems associated
with multiple state regulation over corporations not incorporated in a
state."° Illinois's attempt to use the internal affairs doctrine to sup-
port the benefit of its statute was rejected because its statute could
apply to corporations that were not incorporated in Illinois and
tender offers involve transfers of shares between shareholders and
third parties.'" Because the court in Edgar based its rejection of the
internal affairs argument on the fact that the internal affairs doctrine
did not apply to the statute, it is unclear whether the single law princi-
ple will be accepted when the doctrine is applicable. 102
In considering the significance of allowing the benefit of using
state corporate law as a single law principle to be weighed in the bal-
ance, the Court should recognize its traditional deference to state cor-
porate law. In Shaffer v. Heitner,03 the Court recognized in a
footnote that the internal affairs doctrine is based more upon the need
for uniformity and certainty than upon perceived state interests. In
Cort v. Ash,"° the Court emphasized that corporations are creatures
of state law and "except where federal law expressly requires certain
responsibilities of directors with respect to stockholders, state law will
govern the internal affairs of the corporation."' ' In Santa Fe Indus-
tries v. Green, °6 the Court reiterated its views in Cort and indicated
that without clear indication of congressional intent, it would be
"reluctant to federalize the substantial portion of the law of corpora-
98. Horowitz, supra note 97, at 814. The Supreme Court has found that statutes that
create an inconsistent regulatory pattern impermissibly interfere with interstate commerce.
E.g., Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, 359 U.S. 520 (1959).
99. Kozyris, supra note 96, at 35.
100. Edgar v. Mite, 457 U.S. 624, 642 (1982).
101. Id. at 624; see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 302 (1971).
102. See infra notes 132-58 and accompanying text.
103. 433 U.S. 186, 215 n.44 (1977). Justice Brennan suggested in his dissent that because a
corporation is the creature of the state, actions that impact on the management of the
corporation, whose powers and duties are defined by state law, implicate the state's public
policy. Id. at 228 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
104. 422 U.S. 66 (1975).
105. Id. at 84. In Burks v. Lasker, the Court reiterated the importance of state corporate
law: "Congress has never indicated that the entire corpus of state corporation law is to be
replaced simply because a plaintiff's cause of action is based upon a federal statute." 441 U.S.
471, 478 (1979).
106. 430 U.S. 462 (1977).
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tions that deals with transactions in securities, particularly where
established state policies of corporate regulation would be overrid-
den."" 7 This deference to state corporate law does not indicate that
states are free to enact statutes highly restrictive of interstate com-
merce. But it does show that courts should be wary of using their
power under the commerce clause to invalidate state corporate law.
Otherwise, the impact of the courts may be federalization through
nullification of particular state corporate laws.
B. The Market for Corporate Charters
Legal scholars have long debated whether state corporate law
protects investors. '0 8 Those on both sides of the debate recognize that
states compete for incorporations, thereby creating a market for cor-
porate charters but disagree about whether the market protects share-
holders. While I am not convinced that the market for charters is
protective of shareholders, the Court should consider the interstate
competition inherent in this market and the importance of the inter-
nal affairs doctrine to maintaining this competition when determining
if state law impermissibly interferes with interstate commerce.
The development of state corporate statutes from a regulatory
focus to an enabling law should be considered when analyzing state
law under the commerce clause.0 9 Corporate existence in the United
States began as a special privilege granted by the legislature and cor-
porations were subject to extensive state law limitations. "0 The com-
petition between states for corporate charters, described by Justice
Brandeis as a race "not of diligence but of laxity,"' " began with the
liberalization of the corporate laws of New Jersey in the late nine-
teenth century. Some have viewed this development as being
grounded on utility and the need to allow corporations the flexibility
to function as an economic entity with the resulting increase in man-
107. Id. at 479.
108. Compare Cary, supra note I (arguing for minimum federal standards) with R.
WINTER, GOVERNMENT AND THE CORPORATION (1978) (arguing for the continued use of
state corporate law). See generally Romano, Law as a Product: Some Pieces of the
Incorporation Puzzle, I J.L. EcON. & ORG. 225 (1985) [hereinafter Romano, Law as Product];
Romano, The State Competition Debate in Corporate Law, 8 CARDOZO L. REV. - (1987)
[hereinafter Romano, State Competition].
109. See generally Kaplan, Foreign Corporations and Local Corporate Policy, 21 VAND. L.
REV. 433 (1968).
110. See generally W. CARY & M. EISENBERG, CORPORATIONS 1-5 (5th ed. 1980);
Williston, A History of the Law of Business Corporations Before 1800, 2 HARV. L. REV. 105
(1888).
111. Liggett Co. v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517, 558-59 (1933).
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agement power over the shareholders." l2 Critics of the market for
charters theory view it as a "race for the bottom" because states will
sacrifice shareholder protection for a pro-management bias in order to
attract incorporations and the revenue obtained from the incorpora-
tions. State law of this type is a form of economic protectionism
because it protects the state's interest in attracting and keeping
corporations. I I I
Others view the competition in the market for corporate charters
as a healthy development for shareholders. They argue that manage-
ment will generally seek out those states that are beneficial to share-
holders;' " otherwise, the value of the shares of those corporations
will decrease if management is not maximizing the firm's value. The
reduced value of shares increases the corporation's cost of raising cap-
ital, which places the corporation at a cost disadvantage in the market
for its products. A failure to manage in the shareholders' interests
also affects the managers by reducing the value of their services in the
market for managers. If the value of the shares decreases, the market
for corporate control will also serve to protect shareholder interests
by replacing management and encouraging new management to
reincorporate in another state whose law benefits shareholders." 5
Thus, the market for corporate charters encourages states to enact
laws that are beneficial to shareholders.
1' 16
112. See generally J. HURST, THE LEGITIMACY OF THE BUSINESS CORPORATION IN THE
LAW OF THE UNITED STATES (1970).
113. A 1968 report to the New Jersey Legislature stated:
It is clear that the major protections to investors, creditors, employees,
customers, and the general public have come, and must continue to come, from
Federal legislation and not from state corporation acts. . . . Any attempt to
provide such regulations in the public interest through state incorporation acts
and similar legislation would only drive corporations out of the state to more
hospitable jurisdictions.
REPORT OF THE CORPORATION LAW REVISION COMMISSION, June 20, 1968, reprinted in N.J.
STAT. ANN. tit. 14A, ix, xi (West 1969).
114. An empirical study, which Peter Dodd and Richard Leftwich conducted, indicated
that firms that reincorporated experienced positive abnormal returns over a two year period
prior to reincorporating. Dodd & Leftwich, The Market for Corporate Charters: "Unhealthy
Competition" Versus Federal Regulation, 53 J. Bus. 259 (1980). For a thoughtful analysis of
the study and an explanation of reincorporation, see Romano, Law as Product, supra note 108,
at 244-65.
115. See R. WINTER, supra note 108; see also Fischel, The "Race to the Bottom" Revisited:
Reflections on Recent Developments in Delaware's Corporation Law, 76 Nw. U.L. REV. 913
(1982).
116. Underlying the argument supporting the market for corporate charters theory and
much of the law and economics view of corporate law is a theory of the firm that is based upon
a "nexus of contracts." This theory views the corporation as a legal fiction which serves to
facilitate contracting among the corporate constituencies. Because investors benefit by holding
a diverse portfolio of securities, most will choose not to concentrate their holdings and incur
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Under the market for corporate charters thesis, state takeover
statutes must be beneficial to shareholders because states are compet-
ing to enact laws that enhance shareholders' wealth. 17 If the statutes
adversely affect the value of the corporation's shares, then the markets
for products and managers will require reincorporation and states will
compete with each other by eliminating laws that deter takeovers.
Thus, the choice of reincorporation remains as a means to opt out of
those statutes that harm shareholders." 18
Without the internal affairs doctrine, a state will be severely
restricted in its ability to apply its law to shareholders, managers, and
assets outside of the state of incorporation, and thus would be unable
to effectively compete in the market for corporate charters and offer
law that some view as generally beneficial to shareholders. 19 In order
to protect this market, any federal encroachment on the doctrine
through the commerce clause should be restricted. While invalidating
those statutes that limit takeovers may enhance the disciplinary
impact of the market for corporate control, the invalidation also nega-
tively affects the market for corporate charters and the states' ability
to develop their law. States as market participants as opposed to reg-
ulators in the market for corporate charters might be subject to the
"market participant" exception, which limits the use of the interstate
commerce clause to invalidate state activity.'E
C. Corporate Law as Contract
The corporation has emerged as an organization in which much
the substantial costs of monitoring management. The resulting separation of ownership from
management is beneficial because it leaves the running of the business in the hands of
professional managers. While this separation involves costs, the gains from this generally
efficient division of labor should normally outweigh these costs. Several market mechanisms
including the market for charters insures that management will look out for the interests of
shareholders. Fischel, supra note 115, at 917-18.
117. Professor Romano discussed the evidence of whether shareholders benefit by
reincorporations and found an absence of negative returns to reincorporating firms. She also
found that there were no negative returns for corporations reincorporating for antitakeover
reasons. Romano, Law as Product, supra note 108, at 280.
118. If all states had similar takeover statutes, the competition for charters could be
severely limited. But, as indicated, there are several different models and not all statutes
necessarily deter takeovers. Significantly, Delaware has not enacted a pro-management model.
Judge Winter has argued that state takeover legislation may serve to monopolize the market
for management control. R. WINTER, supra note 108, at 43-44. His discussion of state
takeover statutes reflected the first generation statutes that were not limited to corporations
incorporated in the state and thus their restrictions would not affect the market for charters.
Id. The second and third generation are limited to corporations incorporated in the state and
their restriction does impact on the market for charters.
119. R. GILSON, THE LAW AND FINANCE OF CORPORATE AcQuISITIONS 1076-77 (1986).
120. See Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794 (1976).
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can now be accomplished through contractual arrangements.12 State
corporate statutes are no longer regulatory, but are really enabling
statutes which allow greater flexibility in contractual arrangements. 22
Some commentators dispute the notion that all corporate law should
be viewed as contractual and thus subject to variation, particularly
when the controlling shareholders contract to lower fiduciary stan-
dards. 23 While the use of the contract model may not be appropriate
when controlling shareholders attempt to restrict the court's scrutiny
of fiduciary duty, the use of state statutes to implement contracts
between the corporate constituencies seems well established.' 24 The
provisions of most state corporate statutes permit corporations to
vary the statutory requirements if the by-laws or certificate of incor-
poration provide for such variation.' 25 In fact, many states have
explicitly recognized the contractual nature of their law by permitting
corporations to opt out of the particular takeover statute.'26 In some
cases, shareholders have amended their certificates to provide for pro-
visions equivalent to those found in some of the models. 27  Courts
should not use the commerce clause to preclude the state from provid-
ing contractual terms through its statutes that the shareholders can
alter.
Corporations choose to incorporate in a given state and can
choose to reincorporate in a different state. Although such transac-
tions are not without costs, movement can potentially enhance share-
holder wealth.'28 One of the key reasons a corporation chooses a
given state is that particular state's corporate law. While the corpo-
121. See J. HURST, supra note 112; R. WINTER, supra note 108.
122. Kaplan, supra note 109; see Data-Probe Acquisition Corp. v. Datalab, Inc., 722 F.2d I
(2d Cir. 1983). According to Judge Winter, "Mite, of course, did not involve the fiduciary
obligations of a contractual nature imposed by state law." Id. at 5 n.3.
123. See generally Brudney, Corporate Governance, Agency Costs, and The Rhetoric of
Contract, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 1403 (1985); Clark, Agency Costs Versus Fiduciary Duties, in
PRINCIPALS AND AGENTS: THE STRUCTURE OF BUSINESS 55 (J. Pratt & R. Zeckhauser eds.
1985).
124. E.g., Delaware General Corporation Law, DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §102(b)(7) (1985).
The Delaware legislature recently enacted this provision in response to the difficulty in
procuring directors' liability insurance. The statute permits corporations to amend their
certificate to limit director liability in duty of care cases.
125. E.g., N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 616 (McKinney 1983) (permitting the use of
supermajority voting requirements if shareholders vote to place the requirement in the
certificate).
126. One may view shareholders' ability to opt out or into the statutes as further removing
these statutes from being considered state regulation and as encouraging the freedom to
contract. See supra text accompanying notes 152-53.
127. See supra notes 38 & 42.
128. See Romano, Law as Product, supra note 108 (discussing the benefits of reincor-
poration).
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rate charter itself is a contract, 29 it is generally understood that the
terms of that contract include the state's statutory law as it evolves
and its case law interpreting legislative action. By selecting a given
state, the shareholders and managers agree to be bound by the inter-
nal affairs doctrine and that state's law; shareholders purchase and
value the stock with that choice in mind.
130
If one views a corporation in terms of contracts between private
parties, then the burdens imposed on interstate commerce by corpo-
rate law are no greater than contract law. Because many things are
currently achieved through contract, state corporate law provides a
standard legal arrangement which reduces the transaction costs of
private bargaining, thereby benefiting shareholders.131 The use of the
commerce clause to restrict state corporate law development will neg-
atively impact on the benefits shareholders achieve through con-
tracting. The commerce clause should not interfere with the
contractual choice of management and the shareholders to select a
state's law.
D. Van Dusen and CTS
Given that the internal affairs doctrine as a single law benefits
interstate commerce and is important to the market for corporate
charters and the contractual nature of corporate law, I will review the
impact of two recent cases on its use. In APL Limited Partnership v.
Van Dusen Air,"3 2 a federal district court found the Minnesota Con-
trol Acquisition Act unconstitutional because it impermissibly bur-
dened interstate commerce.' The Minnesota statute enacted a
shareholder approval model3 4 that contained penalties for failure to
comply with the statute. These penalties included denial of voting
129. Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819).
130. In Rogers v. Guaranty Trust Co., the Supreme Court indicated, "When, by acquisition
of his stock, plaintiff became a member of the corporation, he, like every other shareholder,
impliedly agreed that in respect of its internal affairs the company was to be governed by the
laws of the State in which it was organized." 288 U.S. 123, 130 (1933).
131. R. WINTER, supra note 108, at 1. Another view of corporate law is that the privilege
of corporate form is a grant from the state and corporate acts are in effect acts of the
government. Id.
132. 622 F. Supp. 1216 (D. Minn. 1985).
133. Id.; see also Johnson, Minnesota's Control Share Acquisition Statute and the Need for
New Judicial Analysis of State Takeover Legislation, 12 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 183 (1986).
In Van Dusen, the parties settled their dispute and the Eighth Circuit declined to consider the
appeal. The Eighth Circuit vacated the judgment so it does not have any direct effect on the
Minnesota statute. Steinbrink, State Takeover Statutes, in SEVENTEENTH ANNUAL
INSTITUTE ON SECURITIES REGULATION 181 n.5 (S. Friedman, C. Nathan, H. Pitt & R.
Santoni eds. 1986).
134. See supra text accompanying notes 32-34.
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and transfer rights for a year and possible redemption at the same
price at which the shares were acquired. The court indicated that
"[tlhere is little doubt that a state has some constitutionally sanc-
tioned right to govern the internal affairs of its corporations.- '1 35 The
issue for the court was whether the internal affairs doctrine applied to
the statute. Although the statute applied only to corporations incor-
porated in Minnesota, the court decided that the internal affairs doc-
trine was inapplicable because the "[r]egulation of shareholders-and
those who would become shareholders-is not the same as regulating
the corporation itself."' 36 This decision is consistent with the Edgar
Court's view that the acquisition of shares does not implicate the
internal affairs doctrine. In dictum, the district court indicated that
"[t]he use of shareholders' power once the shares have been acquired
may well be a proper subject of state regulation ....
The court rejected Minnesota's argument that the model is
analogous to a merger statute, which would be covered by the internal
affairs doctrine. Mergers and sales of assets involve the corporation as
a party, which is not true of transfers of shares. The court indicated
that a merger statute is "a lawful exercise of the state's authority to
regulate a legal entity created by state statute."']3 8 The implications of
Van Dusen are that regulations that directly affect transfers of shares
are impermissible but that the internal affairs doctrine should protect
other activities that regulate the corporate entity and only indirectly
affect shares from invalidation under the commerce clause.
139
135. Van Dusen, 622 F. Supp. at 1223.
136. Id. The court referred to the statement in Edgar that transfers of stock to third parties
"do not themselves implicate the internal affairs of the target company." Id. (quoting Edgar v.
Mite, 457 U.S. 624 (1982)). In Fleet Aerospace Corp. v. Holderman, the court indicated: "If
the tender offer is successful, it is true that voting control may well be changed, but the
changing identity of the shareholder or shareholders owning sufficient stock to exercise control
does not itself change the nature of the corporate entity or alter its internal affairs." 637 F.
Supp. 742, 763 (S.D. Ohio), aff'd, 796 F.2d 135 (6th Cir. 1986).
137. Van Dusen, 622 F. Supp. at 1223-24. The court in Van Dusen indicated that the state
had no interest in protecting nonresident shareholders even if they owned stock in a Minnesota
corporation. Id. at 1222. This statement must be limited to circumstances where internal
affairs is not implicated. Otherwise other provisions of state law such as inspection rights that
are clearly designed to protect shareholders would be inapplicable to nonresident shareholders.
138. Id. at 1224.
139. The courts struck down shareholder approval statutes in Hawaii and Ohio as direct
regulations of interstate commerce. See supra note 69. Because only four Justices in Edgar
found the Illinois statute to be a direct regulation, the courts also analyzed their respective
statutes under the balancing tests used with indirect regulation. In Terry v. Yamshita, 643 F.
Supp. 161 (D. Haw. 1986), and Fleet Aerospace Corp. v. Holderman, 637 F. Supp. 742 (S.D.
Ohio), aff'd, 796 F.2d 135 (6th Cir. 1986), the courts found the shareholder approval model to
be an improper interference with interstate commerce using analysis similar to Van Dusen. See
supra note 69. Because the shareholder approval model directly restricts tender offers, it is
more susceptible to attack than other models because the internal affairs doctrine traditionally
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The Seventh Circuit's opinion in Dynamics Corp. of America v.
CTS Corp. 40 is problematic for the internal affairs doctrine and state
corporate law. Judge Posner, writing for the court, found Indiana's
Control Share Acquisition Act to be preempted by the Williams
Act 4 ' and unconstitutional on interstate commerce grounds. The
Indiana statute was a voting rights model which required approval by
a majority of both shareholders and disinterested shareholders for
share acquisitions of twenty percent or more. An offeror was not pre-
cluded from acquiring the shares, but failure to receive shareholder
approval would mean the denial of voting rights.'4 2 Using the balanc-
ing test, the court viewed the statute as impeding takeovers and trans-
actions between nonresident shareholders, with trivial or negative
benefits to Indiana or its residents. According to the court, "Even if a
corporation's tangible assets are immovable, the efficiency with which
they are employed and the proportion in which the earnings they gen-
erate are divided between management and shareholders depends on
the market for corporate control ... that the state of Indiana is not
authorized to opt out of .... ,, This broad statement of the limits
on a state's ability to regulate when its law adversely affects the mar-
ket for corporate control may have severe consequences for the devel-
opment of state corporate law and invites extensive federal court
scrutiny of traditional corporate law.
The CTS court indicated that the internal affairs doctrine would
not save the statute."' The court conceded that a state has broad
latitude in regulating internal affairs even if the regulating complicates
takeover efforts; but when a statute's "effect on the interstate market
in securities and corporate control is direct, intended, and substan-
tial[,] it is not merely the incidental effect of a general regulation of
internal corporate governance." ''
did not cover the transfers of shares, which are not a matter of organic structure or internal
administration. Yet the court in Fleet also relied on Judge Posner's analysis in Dynamics
Corp. of America v. CTS Corp., 794 F.2d 250 (7th Cir.), prob. juris noted, 107 S. Ct. 258
(1986). See infra notes 143-45 and accompanying text.
140. 794 F.2d 250 (7th Cir.), prob. juris. noted, 107 S. Ct. 258 (1986).
141. Judge Posner accepted the view of Justice White and two other Justices that the
Williams Act was designed to maintain a balance between incumbent management and the
offeror. The court refused to allow the delays effectively imposed by the Indiana statute, which
provided that the shareholder meeting concerning a tender offer could take place as long as
fifty days after the tender offer commenced (as contrasted with the Williams Act time period of
approximately a month). Id. at 261.
142. Id. If the offeror failed to file an acquiring person's statement, the corporation could
redeem the shares at "fair value." Id.
143. Id. at 264.
144. Id.
145. Id. In Fleet, the court cited with approval the discussion of internal affairs in CTS,
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Judge Posner's opinion extends the scope of the commerce clause
further into the state corporate law area. The Indiana statute signifi-
cantly differs from the shareholder approval model found unconstitu-
tional in Van Dusen, because it restricts not the acquisition or selling
of the shares but the voting rights of those shares. Under Van Dusen,
restrictions on voting rights are within the internal affairs doctrine
and thus permissible.
There is no question that denial of voting rights will thwart a
tender offer and may negatively affect the value of those shares, but so
does other traditional state law. The court in CTS indicated that pro-
visions such as those providing for cumulative voting, which can
delay an offeror's ability to take complete control of the board and
thus detract from the benefits of a tender offer, should not be affected
by the court's holding because the effect of a cumulative voting provi-
sion on the market for corporate control is not "direct, intended, and
substantial." 1
46
The voting rights model found in Indiana is not as direct a regu-
lation of the market for corporate control as the shareholder approval
model that directly precludes the transactions of shares. Under the
voting rights model, one can acquire the shares without a shareholder
vote. The voting rights model in Indiana was intended to affect the
market for corporate control but legislative intent is not always clear.
The impact of the model is substantial; this impact, however, may
also encourage the market and protect the shareholders. The statutes
could enhance shareholders' premium by encouraging negotiations
and the auctioning of the corporation to a higher value. Even those
who favor the market for corporate control cannot agree on whether
it is beneficial for management to be passive toward takeovers or to
auction the corporation.' 47 The shareholder vote may also protect the
shareholders from front-loaded two tier takeovers.
According to the CTS court, the Indiana statute is "an explicit
and the distinction between mergers and tender offers found in Van Dusen. Fleet Aerospace
Corp. v. Holderman, 637 F. Supp. 742, 761-63 (S.D. Ohio), aff'd, 796 F.2d 135 (6th Cir. 1986)
(citing CTS, 794 F.2d at 264; Van Dusen, 622 F. Supp. at 1223-24). See supra notes 138-39
and accompanying text.
146. CTS, 794 F.2d at 264.
147. Compare Easterbrook & Fischel, The Proper Role of Target's Management in
Responding to a Tender Offer, 94 HAV. L. REV. 1161, 1165-74 (1981) (management should
be passive when faced with a tender offer) with Gilson, A Structural Approach to Corporations.
The Case Against Defensive Tactics in Tender Offers, 33 STAN. L. REV. 819 (1981)
(management should bargain with offeror to secure higher price or seek a competitive bid) and
Bebchuk, The Case for Facilitating Competing Tender Offers, 95 HARV. L. REV, 1028 (1982)
(same). The idea that directors should auction their company when an offer is made is gaining
acceptance by the courts. E.g., Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506
A.2d 173 (Del. 1986).
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regulation of tender offers," and even though it is a voting rights stat-
ute, it is subject to review; otherwise, it "would invite facile evasions
of the clause."' 48 Judge Posner seems to assume that the commerce
clause protects the market for corporate control without regard to the
effect of state regulation in benefiting other markets such as the mar-
ket for charters. The internal affairs doctrine, which encourages use
of a single law, the market for corporate charters, and the contracting
rights of the constituent corporate groups all enhance interstate
commerce.
How close a relationship between a statutory provision and the
market for corporate control is required before it is found to be
unconstitutional? My discussion has primarily focused on state statu-
tory takeover provisions, but the commerce clause, as analyzed by
Judge Posner, could also be used to upset other law. Does a case in
which a court views the common law as allowing directors a free
reign to thwart takeovers, such as by implementing a poison pill
defense which could preclude a hostile offer, violate the interstate
commerce clause as having a direct, intended, and substantial effect
on the market for corporate control?' 49 Does the implementation of
the poison pill pursuant to a statutory grant or a general legislative
authorization violate the commerce clause? 5 ° If the shareholders, by
148. CTS, 794 F.2d at 264.
149. Poison pills involve actions that have repercussions to an offeror that will be as if it
swallowed a poison pill. See Chittur, Wall Street's Teddy Bear. The "Poison Pill" as a
Takeover Defense, I I J. CORP. L. 25 (1985).
150. It is not always easy to determine whether a state legislature intended a particular
statute to regulate tender offers. In 1984, the New York legislature amended section 512 of the
New York Business Corporation Law to authorize redeemable shares, which are necessary for
poison pills that use preferred shares. See generally Note, Protecting Shareholders Against
Partial and Two-Tiered Takeovers. The "Poison Pill" Preferred, 97 HARV. L. REv. 1964
(1984). Redeemable shares also have other uses in corporate finance. Would that statutory
amendment or its implementation pursuant to the statute fail under Judge Posner's thesis?
How would Judge Posner respond to the following explanation?
The legislation also would provide for the issuance of certain classes of stock
heretofore prohibited under the business corporation law. Specifically, a
corporation is presently prohibited from issuing any stock which give the
shareholder the right to compel the corporation to redeem the shares. Under the
proposed amendment, a company could elect to issue a class of preferred shares
which gives the shareholder redemption rights. Neither corporations nor
shareholders have the option today of issuing or purchasing this type of stock
from New York incorporated companies even though such stock is [sic] come
into accepted practice in the financial markets. The economic debate of whether
takeovers are good for the overall economy is not the subject of this legislation.
However, this legislation would say to the management of corporations that New
York State is moving to provide a corporate law climate in which a company
could receive shareholder approval for measures which will allow it to focus on
the long term competitiveness of their companies and not be encumbered with
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amending the certificate, approve a dual classification of shares that
allows management or a family group the bulk of the voting rights
pursuant to state statutory authority, will the certificate amendment
be precluded because it is authorized by statute and adversely affects
the market for corporate control?' 15 While none of these actions is
authorized by a specific statute enacted to deal with tender offers such
as the models, they do represent state sponsored activities taken pur-
suant to the corporate law of the state that has a direct, intended, and
substantial effect on the market for corporate control.
The role of the shareholders may be important in a court's analy-
sis of whether a statute violates the commerce clause. Shareholders
are not usually involved in the approval or implementation of the
poison pill preferred because the board of directors has the authority
to issue preferred stock. Yet the shareholders at some point would
have had to authorize the preferred stock by amending the certificate
of incorporation. Shareholder approval of the creation of two classes
of common stock with different voting rights would be required. If
the shareholders' role is significant because it further removes the
state's role in regulating and encourages private contracting," 2 then
the fact that some of the statutory models, particularly the third gen-
eration statutes, allow the corporation to opt out of its requirements
should also be considered significant.'53
the emphasis on short-term performance which is often the case with companies
which live under pressure of hostile takeovers.
1984 NEW YORK STATE LEGISLATIVE ANNUAL, MEMORANDUM OF SENATOR JESS J. PRES-
ENT 211 (emphasis added).
151. The New York Stock Exchange recently approved changes in its listing standard to
allow recapitalizations that create different classes of voting common stock. See generally
Karmel, The SEC's Power to Regulate Stockholders Voting Rights, N.Y.L.J., Aug. 21, 1986, at
1, col. 1. The SEC will hold public hearings in 1987 on this controversial issue.
152. Cf Moran v. Household Int'l, Inc., 500 A.2d 1346, 1353 (Del. 1985) ("The fact that
directors of a corporation act pursuant to a state statute provides an insufficient nexus to the
state for there to be state action which may violate the Commerce Clause or Supremacy
Clause."). The ability of shareholders to act could also provide an insufficient nexus for state
action.
153. For example, the New York business combination statute permits corporations to opt
out of the provisions of the statute after 18 months if a majority of the disinterested
shareholders pass an appropriate bylaw. N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 912(d)(3) (McKinney
1986). Indiana allows corporations to opt out of its voting rights statute prior to the
acquisition of the "control shares" if provided for in the certificate of incorporation or bylaws.
IND. CODE § 23-1-42-5 (1986). The idea of opting into a statute by a shareholder vote as
opposed to opting out is arguably more in line with the idea of shareholder rights and
corporate law as enabling. Yet, shareholders have shown a willingness to amend their
certificates by adding antitakeover amendments viewed as harmful to shareholders. See Shark
Repellents: The Role and Impact of Antitakeover Charter Amendments, [1984-1985 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 83,714 (September 7, 1984) (study of SEC office of Chief
Economist). One could use this evidence to suggest that shareholder voting is meaningless or
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The distinction in Van Dusen between the transfer of shares and
the use of shares does less harm to the internal affairs doctrine, the
market for corporate charters, and the contractual nature of corpo-
rate law than Judge Posner's thesis. The Van Dusen distinction
between the acquisition of shares and their use fits within the tradi-
tional coverage of the internal affairs doctrine. The distinction also is
consistent with the traditional corporate law view that stock has the
attributes of property and restrictions on transferability imposed after
the issuance of stock are usually not allowed. 54 Changes affecting the
use of the stock, such as changes in voting rights, are generally per-
mitted under corporate law by a shareholder vote.
Under the Van Dusen rationale, the shareholder approval model
is unconstitutional, but the third generation statutes (voting rights
and business combination models) appear to survive because they
affect the use of shares and do not directly affect one's ability to
acquire shares. The second tier and fiduciary duty models also do not
directly impact on the acquisition of shares. The full disclosure model
limits purchases in a particular state and would seem to be saved by
section 28 of the Securities and Exchange Act and language in Edgar
recognizing that protection of local investors is a significant local ben-
efit.' 5  The redemption model creates an equal opportunity for all
shareholders to sell on the same terms and thus requires offerors to
buy all the shares offered. One can argue that the law is designed to
protect shareholders by creating a market, but Van Dusen indicates
that the state has no interest in protecting nonresident shareholders in
the acquisition of shares. Thus the redemption model may not
survive.
Under Judge Posner's view, all of the models could be invalid.
All of them are intended to affect the market for corporate control
and have as much a direct effect as the voting rights model found
unconstitutional in CTS. An issue that remains unclear under Judge
Posner's test is how substantial must the effect of these models be on
the market? Each model involves costs to the offeror which might
deter a tender offer. Of all the models, the second tier may be the
fairest to shareholders because it insures shareholders an equal oppor-
tunity to sell shares when the offeror decides to take complete control
of the corporation. Judge Posner would seem to favor that model
because he distinguishes fair price amendments from the use of poison
that shareholders are willing to accept defensive mechanisms because they increase their
premiums. Cf. Romano, State Compelition, supra note 108.
154. See generally W. CARY & M. ESIENBERG, CORPORATIONS 468-78 (1980).
155. Edgar v. Mite, 457 U.S. 624, 641 (1982).
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pills because the former heads "off a stampede to tender that may
reduce the price of the tender" whereas the latter dilutes the value of
the shares thereby defeating the object of the tender offer.'5 6
The potential invalidation of all of the models under Judge Pos-
ner's thesis and the invitation to the courts to invalidate other state
corporate law harms the interests that the internal affairs doctrine
protects. The negating of state corporate law will adversely affect its
development and the market for corporate charters. It will also
restrict the ability of corporate constituencies to contract.
I believe that the Van Dusen distinction should serve as a starting
point for a court's analysis of the impact of state corporate laws on
interstate commerce. Courts should first determine whether the law
in question directly restricts the transfers of shares or, rather, regu-
lates the use of those shares. If it affects the transfers of shares, then
the statute would normally not be covered by the internal affairs doc-
trine and thus would be subject to the balancing test. If the law
involves the use of shares and similar issues with respect to which the
internal affairs doctrine traditionally has been applied, then the com-
merce clause should, most often, not invalidate the statute; rather
such a statute should be presumed to be valid.
The importance of internal affairs in the analysis of interstate
commerce and this presumption of validity does not mean that a state
is free to enact any legislation that applies to corporations incorpo-
rated in the state and that is within the internal affairs doctrine.' 57 If
a statute is found to burden directly or discriminate against interstate
commerce, courts should find that it impermissibly interferes with
interstate commerce. For example, I would assume that a state that
passed legislation prohibiting a corporation from reincorporating in
another state would violate the commerce clause, even though the
statute regulates internal affairs.'
VI. CONCLUSION
The courts should not use the commerce clause to affect the
156. Dynamics Corp. of Am. v. CTS Corp., 794 F.2d 250, 255 (7th Cir.), prob. juris noted,
107 S. Ct. 258 (1986).
157. Cf. South-Central Timber Dev. v. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82 (1984) (limiting the market
participant exception, which allows the state a greater role under the commerce clause, to the
relevant market).
158. In Great Western United Corp. v. Kidwell, the Fifth Circuit indicated that "statutes
requiring business operations be performed in the home state that could more efficiently be
performed elsewhere impose a burden on commerce that isperse illegal." 577 F.2d 1256, 1282
(5th Cir. 1978) (citing Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 145 (1970)), rev'd sub nor.
Leroy v. Great W. United Corp., 443 U.S. 173 (1979).
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development of state corporate law, but should recognize the impor-
tance of the internal affairs doctrine and that doctrine should serve as
an important factor in determining whether state corporate law
impermissibly interferes with interstate commerce. This principle rec-
ognizes the importance of a single law governing corporations, the
market for corporate charters, and the contractual basis of corporate
law and its importance to shareholders. Applying the commerce
clause broadly to invalidate state corporate law would undermine
these developments which often are beneficial to commerce.
If state takeover statutes result in harm to shareholders, noncon-
stitutional remedies are available. The statutes have not eliminated
the idea that directors are fiduciaries and have a duty to protect the
interests of shareholders. Courts have not allowed the business judg-
ment rule to permit management to oppose takeovers at all costs.' 59
There is no evidence that any of the models have insulated a corpora-
tion from a hostile takeover or an eventual buyout at a premium.,
60
Proxy fights are still available to opt out of a statute or change man-
agement who would support a takeover. Individual shareholders are
still able to express their views on corporate policy through the share-
holder proposal mechanism permitted by the federal proxy rules.' 6'
Although all these checks on management power have costs, unbri-
dled takeovers and the lessened influence of internal affairs also have
costs.
In the past, when state law was viewed as inadequate to protect
investors or shareholders, it was Congress who reacted with appropri-
ate legislation such as federal securities regulation. Those who argued
that state law was lax argued for federal minimum standards. If state
takeover laws are further undermining the protection of shareholders,
then the remedy should be federal legislation directed at tender offer
abuses or accepting a preemption argument, not an open-ended use of
the interstate commerce clause.
159. CTS, 794 F.2d at 256 (discussing Delaware caselaw concerning the business judgment
rule).
160. Cf Id. at 255 (Judge Posner conceded that the evidence is mixed as to whether
particular defensive tactics could increase or decrease shareholder welfare.. But cf Romano,
State Competition, supra note 108 (viewing statutes like other defensive tactics as increasing
premiums at the cost of a reduced number of bids).
161. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8 (1982). Shareholder proposals have frequently been used to
suggest corporate activities that might enhance investor wealth. For example, the
shareholders of TWA sought to separate the airline business from its other operations. The
shareholders lost the proxy fight, but succeeded in convincing management to implement the
suggestion. Levy, Inside the Battle Over Trans World, FORTUNE, June 13, 1983, at 106.
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